Supreme Court Ruling on 16th Presidential Reference

Supreme Court Ruling on 16th Presidential Reference

Why in News?

On November 20, 2025, a five-judge Bench of the Supreme Court addressed the 16th Presidential Reference under Article 143, providing clarity on whether courts can mandate timelines for Governors and the President in taking decisions on Bills.

Presidential References under Article 143

• About: Presidential References are a mechanism under Article 143 of the Indian Constitution, where the President of India can seek the Supreme Court’s opinion on questions of law or fact that are of public importance. The Presidential Reference mechanism under Article 143 underlines an institutional dialogue between the executive and the judiciary.

• • Provision: Under Article 143(1) of the Indian Constitution, the President has the power to refer to the Supreme Court questions of law or fact that, in the President’s view, are of public importance and where obtaining the Court’s opinion is expedient. 
    • The Supreme Court, after hearing as it deems fit, may report its opinion back to the President. 
    • The Supreme Court has a discretion whether to answer a Presidential Reference. It can refuse to opine if the questions are purely political, hypothetical, or otherwise unsuitable for judicial resolution. 
    • The Court’s opinion under this Article is advisory only, not binding on the President. The President is free to accept or reject them. 
    • The provision borrows from the Government of India Act, 1935, which allowed the Governor-General to seek advisory views from the then Federal Court under Section 213.
    • Also, Article 145(3) mandates that a Presidential reference be heard by a Constitution Bench of at least five judges.

• Historical Use: Since independence, Article 143 has been invoked rarely. Legal experts count about 14 to 15 Presidential References made so far. Some landmark references include:

• • Delhi Laws Case (1951) – the first reference, on the question of delegated legislation. 
  • Kerala Education Bill (1958) – about the compatibility of certain educational provisions with fundamental rights. 
  • Berubari Union case (1960) – on whether ceding territory requires a constitutional amendment. 
  • Third Judges Case (1998) – linked to the collegium system for judicial appointments.

The 16th Presidential Reference

• On May 13, 2025, President Droupadi Murmu invoked Article 143(1) of the Constitution to refer 14 questions to the Supreme Court.
• The President challenged an April 8, 2025 judgment by a two‑judge bench of the Court hearing “The State of Tamil Nadu v. the Governor of Tamil Nadu & the Union of India (2025)” that had laid down strict timelines for Governors and the President to act on Bills passed by state legislatures.
• The President asked whether fixed deadlines for Governors under Article 200, such as returning or assenting to Bills, are valid when the Constitution does not explicitly prescribe them.
• The President also questioned whether the President must act on Bills reserved for her under Article 201 within any time limit, since the Constitution does not define one.
• Another key question was whether the Court can interpret a failure to act within such timelines by creating a notion of “deemed assent” under Article 142, which gives it a broad power to do “complete justice.”
• The President sought clarity on whether the decisions of Governors and the President under Articles 200 and 201 are justiciable — that is, can be challenged in court before a Bill becomes law.
• The President also asked whether the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers legally binds the Governor when he exercises his options under Article 200.
• The President raised the issue of whether Article 361, which grants immunity to Governors and the President, bars judicial review of their actions under these Articles.

Supreme Court’s Interpretation and Key Observations

• Rejection of Fixed Timelines: The Court held that fixed timelines for Governors (under Article 200) and the President (under Article 201) to act on Bills cannot be imposed by courts. It reasoned that the elasticity built into the Constitution for these offices would be violated by judicial deadlines. The Court noted that there is no constitutionally prescribed time limit, so it is inappropriate to force fixed dates on them.

• Limited Judicial Review in Cases of Inaction: While the Court rejected rigid deadlines, it also said that Governors cannot delay indefinitely. If there is a “prolonged, unexplained and indefinite” inaction, then courts can step in via limited mandamus. However, the Court clarified that in such cases, it will not evaluate the merits of the Governor’s or President’s decision — just direct them to act. 

• Discretion of Governor Preserved: The Court reaffirmed that a Governor has three constitutional options under Article 200: assent, return the Bill with comments, or reserve the Bill for the President. The Court explicitly rejected any “fourth option” of withholding without sending back or referring. It held that the Governor’s choice among these options is a discretionary function, not strictly bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. 

• No ‘Deemed Assent’: The Court strongly rejected the concept of “deemed assent” (i.e., that a Bill may be treated as having been assented if no action is taken within a judicially imposed timeline). It said that treating non-action as assent by judicial fiat amounts to a takeover of executive functions by the judiciary. Using Article 142 (power to do “complete justice”) to create deemed assent is impermissible under the Constitution. 

• Limited Role Despite Article 361 Immunity: The Court noted that Article 361, which grants personal immunity to Governors and the President, does not fully shield their offices from scrutiny. While the constitutional office of the Governor is subject to limited judicial review, personal liability remains barred. Inaction may invite review, but only to ensure that constitutional duties are carried out.

• Need for Dialogue: The Court emphasized that in India’s federal system, Governors should engage in dialogue with the legislature, not obstruct it. It said that dialogue must replace a “sit‑on-it” approach, and constitutional actors should avoid obstructionism. The Court framed this as part of separation of powers.

Implications of the Supreme Court’s judgment

• Reinforcement of Separation of Powers: The judgment emphasizes that the judiciary cannot encroach on the constitutional functions of the executive. It reinforces the idea that each branch of government has distinct powers.
• Clarification of Advisory Role: It clarifies the scope of Presidential References under Article 143. Courts can give opinions and guidance, but they cannot make binding decisions over the President or Governors.
• Limits of Judicial Activism: The ruling highlights the boundaries of judicial activism. Courts can interpret laws and resolve disputes but cannot create new powers or procedures for executive offices.
• Strengthening Federal Principles: By protecting the discretion of Governors, the judgment respects state autonomy and supports cooperative federalism, allowing states and central institutions to function without undue interference.
• Precedent for Future Governance Issues: The decision sets a legal and constitutional precedent for how courts handle advisory requests from the President. It provides guidance for future Presidential References and other constitutional consultations.